Guest Post by Hassan Baig
(Accessible at http://pakistanmartiallaw.blogspot.com/2007/12/open-letter-from-aitzaz.html)
Barrister Chaudhry Aitzaz Ahsan is a leader in his own right. A populist leader even. Moreover, his read of the political spectrum and all developing eventualities is sensible and practical.
But perhaps not practical enough.
Ms. Benazir Bhutto is widely believed to be averse to the idea of the reinstatement of the deposed judges. In fact, she has gone as far as publicly chiding the lawyer community (and probably Barrister Ahsan in particular) to form their own political party if they so wish. This stand is understandable when seen under the light of the economics of it: the political and self-preservation costs to Ms. Bhutto of a reopening of her files by independent-minded judges are far greater than the costs of loss (if any) of the PPP’s public appeal as a result of her endorsement of the establishment’s agenda. Ms. Bhutto would never underwrite an option which pays dividends only in moral rectitude and not in monetary and/or realpolitik terms.
For someone so ethically-decided, it is abnormal how PPP loyalists endure in their support for Ms. Bhutto. It is almost as if her metamorphosis from her debut in 1988 to the skilful opportunism management she practices today has been completely lost on these supporters. Some quarters insist that Ms. Bhutto’s support is a product of her hereditary right – that many support her with blind conviction borne of the psychological guilt of inaction, engendered among the loyalists when her father was hanged till death without much ado. This is perhaps a major ingredient for Ms. Bhutto’s political adhesiveness, but probably not the only one. There’s also that promise – only to political heavyweights albeit – of garnering a high Internal Rate of Return[i]. And on some level, there’s probably ideological mesmerism involved too - at least for those few who are still motivated by overarching principles instead of material agencies.
Even Superman would envy the kind of powers our man Mr. Musharraf has. After all not every man heading the army can impose an emergency, then ratify it as President and subsequently get it validated by the Supreme Court (or rather a more pliable Supreme Court).
Were we better off until November 2 when the General wanted a compromise or are we better placed since November 3? By “we” I mean the civil society and political actors including the honourable judges of the Court?